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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR. , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900166 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Vigil refers this Court to his opening brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issue, standard of review, the 
facts, and the case. Appellant's opening brief at 1-3. The actual 
facts alleged by the State are not necessary for this Court to 
resolve the legal issue presented in this interlocutory appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Model Penal Code, Utah case law, and case law from 
other jurisdictions support Mr. Vigil's argument that attempted 
depraved indifference homicide does not constitute an offense. An 
actual intent to kill—not a mental state of equivalent 
culpability—is required for an attempted murder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. CASE LAW AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE SUPPORT 
MR. VIGIL'S ARGUMENT THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE HOMICIDE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
OFFENSE. 
The State argues that "Utah's attempt statute, section 
76-4-101, is derived from the Model Penal Code," and that a comment 
to Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 501 (1985) ("M.P.C.") suggests that 
attempted depraved indifference murder is a viable crime in Utah. 
See State's brief at 8-10. In making such an argument, the State 
misreads the portion of the comment which it quotes on pages 8-9 of 
its brief and fails to read the comment as a whole. 
In State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) 
(per curiam), this Court stated: 
The statute adopts the definition of an "attempt" 
employed in the Model Penal Code, §5.01, purposed 
on drawing the line further away from the final 
act and enlarging the common law concept. 
While Utah's statute adopts the M.P.C. definition of 
attempt, the statute is not a verbatim replica of the M.P.C. M.P.C. 
§ 5.01(1) states: 
Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt 
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for commission of the crime, he: 
(a) purposely engages in conduct that 
would constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as he believes them to 
be; or 
(b) when causing a particular result is 
an element of the crime, does or omits to do 
anything with the purpose of causing or with 
the belief that it will cause such result 
without further conduct on his part; or 
(c) purposely does or omits to do 
anything that, under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, is an act or omission 
constituting a substantial step in a course 
of conduct planned to culminate in his 
commission of the crime. 
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By contrast, Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-101 (1990), states in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not 
constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to 
commit the offense. 
The portion of the comment to M.P.C. § 5.01 quoted by the 
State on pages 8-9 of its brief refers specifically to subsection 
1(b) of M.P.C. § 5.01. The language in subsection 1(b) was not 
adopted by this state. 
Subsection 1(b) deals with situations where the actor has 
the purpose of causing a specific result or the belief that his 
conduct will cause a specific result; in a depraved indifference 
situation, the actor merely knows that his conduct creates a grave 
risk of death, not that it will cause a death.1 
Furthermore, the portion of the comment quoted by the State 
refers to a factual scenario which does not constitute depraved 
indifference. The comment states that: 
[A]n actor commits an attempt when he does or 
omits to do anything with the purpose of causing 
"or with the belief that it will cause" such 
result without further conduct on his part. 
1. In a situation where the actor knows his conduct will cause a 
death, a charge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) rather than 
§ 76-5-203(1)(c) is appropriate. 
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Thus, a belief that death will ensue from the 
actor#s conduct . . . will suffice, as well as 
would a purpose to bring about the results. 
(emphasis added). M.P.C, art. 5, § 501. 
The example quoted by the State involves a situation where 
the actor knows that death will result as the "inevitable 
consequence" of the actor's conduct. The comment points out that 
"the concept of 'intent' has always been an ambiguous one and might 
be thought to include results that the actor believed to be the 
inevitable consequence of his conduct." Id. at 305. In other 
words, under the circumstances outlined in the quote on pages 8-9 of 
the State's brief, the actor may well have "intended" the death; 
this is distinct from depraved indifference which requires only a 
knowledge by the actor that he or she has created a grave risk of 
death. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
In addition, as the State acknowledges on page 9 of its 
brief,"[o]nly a minority of recent revisions have explicitly 
followed the Model Penal Code on this point" (citing M.P.C. at 305). 
Finally, in relying on the quoted passage, the State fails 
to consider the remainder of the same comment. Immediately prior to 
the quoted passage, the comment points out that where an actor 
engages in conduct which recklessly or negligently creates a risk of 
death, "[t]he approach of the Model Penal Code is not to treat such 
behavior as an attempt." Id. at 304. 
More importantly, immediately following the passage quoted 
by the State, the comment states: 
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Since a particular crime must actually be 
intended, the charge must be precise and must not 
permit the jury to convict the actor on one of 
several mental states. Thus when the charge is 
attempted murder or assault with intent to kill, 
it is error to permit conviction on a finding of 
reckless disregard for human life (footnote 
omitted) or intent to inflict grievous bodily 
harm (footnote omitted). And since a conviction 
for murder can be premised on either of these 
mental states - as well as on intent to kill - it 
is improper to say that one can be convicted of 
attempted murder if he could have been convicted 
of murder had the victim died. There must be a 
specific intent to kill. 
Id. at 306-7 (emphasis added). This passage not only clarifies that 
intent to kill is required for an attempted murder charge under the 
Model Penal Code, it also refutes the broad policy argument made by 
the State in closing. See State's brief at 13. 
The State also argues that in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 
(Utah 1989), this Court really meant to say that attempted murder 
"requires an intent to kill or a mental state equivalent thereto" 
(State's brief at 8). Such a position ignores the clear language of 
Bell, the rationale behind the Bell decision, and the rationale of 
the decisions explicitly relied on by this Court in reaching its 
decision in Bell. 
As Mr. Vigil pointed out in his opening brief at 7-8, in 
Bell, this Court stated that to be guilty of an attempt, one must 
intend to consummate the crime and that to be guilty of an attempted 
murder, one must intend to kill. Appellant's opening brief at 7-8; 
Bell, 785 P.2d at 394. Nothing in Bell supports the State's 
assertion that this Court meant to include mental states which are 
equivalent to intent to kill; although the State claims that in 
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Bell, this "Court emphasized that felony murder, insofar as the 
homicide is concerned, does not require proof of any culpable mental 
state" (State's brief at 7), no such emphasis occurs in Bell. 
Instead, this Court emphasized the requirement that one intend to 
kill in order to be guilty of an attempted murder. Bell, 785 P.2d 
at 393-4.2 
The cases relied upon by this Court in reaching its 
decision in Bell also refute the State's argument that a specific 
intent to kill is not required for attempted murder. See Bell, 785 
P.2d at 393. State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984), does not 
involve felony-murder; instead, the Huff court discussed the 
"logical impossibility" of attempted murder based on a "knowing" 
mental state. 469 A.2d at 1253. 
The State attempts to distinguish Huff by arguing that the 
Maine statute has an additional sentence which requires the "intent 
to complete the commission of the crime." State's brief at 10, 
footnote 7. However, the State acknowledges the argument that the 
"extra" sentence in the Maine statute is "essentially the same as 
[the language] which appears in subsection (2) of section 
76-4-101." State's brief at 10. Case law from this Court 
demonstrates that Utah's attempt statute requires an intent to 
consummate the target offense. See State v. Harmon, 612 P.2d 291, 
292 (Utah 1986). In addition, this Court has already decided that 
2. In at least five places in the Bell decision, this Court 
mentioned the necessity of the actor having an intent to kill in 
order to be convicted of attempted murder. 785 P.2d at 393-4. 
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Maine's attempt statute is similar to Utah's attempt statute. Bell, 
785 P.2d at 393. Hence, the State's attempts to distinguish this 
Court's reliance on Huff are not convincing. 
Furthermore, the State does not even attempt to distinguish 
the cases cited by this Court for the proposition that "numerous 
courts have held that the crime of attempted murder requires a 
specific intent to kill." Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, footnote 13. For 
example, in People v. Mitchell, 424 N.E.2d 658, 661 (111. App. 
1981), the court stated: 
The offense of attempt (murder) requires the 
mental state of specific intent to commit 
murder. Knowledge that the consequences of an 
act may result in death or grave bodily injury, 
or intent to do bodily harm is not enough, 
[citation omitted] 
In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988), this 
Court made the following statement: 
These terms [the four culpable mental states 
listed in the second degree murder statute] are 
comparable to the old malice aforethought, but 
are much more precise and less confusing. The 
statute treats these forms of homicides as having 
similar culpability. Second degree murder is 
based on a very high degree of moral 
culpability. That culpability arises either from 
an actual intent to kill or from a mental state 
that is essentially equivalent thereto—such as 
intending grievous bodily injury and knowingly 
creating a very high risk of death. The risk of 
death in the latter two circumstances must be so 
great as to evidence such an indifference to life 
as to be tantamount to that evidenced by an 
intent to kill. In contrast, the felony-murder 
provision of the second degree murder statute is 
something of an exception to the above principle, 
as it does not recruire an intent to kill or any 
other similar mental state. 
The State latches onto the last sentence quoted above, and 
argues that because felony-murder does not involve a mental state 
similar to that of intent to kill, the rationale of Bell is not 
applicable to attempted depraved murder. Regardless of whether 
felony-murder involves a level of culpability similar to that of 
intent to kill, the repeated references in Bell to the necessity of 
an intent to kill in order to be convicted of attempted murder are 
applicable in the depraved indifference context; in Bell, this Court 
did not base its decision on the idea that one who commits a 
felony-murder has a lesser degree of culpability than one who is 
charged with attempted depraved indifference. Instead, it based its 
decision on the lack of intent to kill. See discussion supra at 6. 
In addition, the meaning of the quoted Standiford paragraph 
is not clear. At the outset of the paragraph, this Court pointed 
out that the statute treats the various forms of second degree 
murder as having similar culpability and that a high degree of 
culpability is required for second degree murder. An individual who 
intentionally commits one of the serious felonies specified in 
§ 76-5-203(1)(d) resulting in a death certainly has a level of 
culpability on par with one who knowingly creates a risk of death. 
The dictum in the last sentence should not be used as a basis for 
backtracking on this Court's straightforward message in Bell, 
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), and State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), that an intent to kill is required in order to 
be convicted of attempted homicide. (See Appellant's opening brief 
at 8.) 
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The majority of cases addressing the issue have determined 
that an intent to kill is necessary in order to convict for 
attempted murder. See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393-4 (and cases 
cited therein). Courts which have addressed the issue of whether 
depraved indifference murder exists have found that such a crime is 
a "logical impossibility" since it requires that the actor intend to 
commit an unintended killing. See State v. Johnson, 707 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (N.M. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa. Super. 39, 
456 A.2d 171 (1983). 
The only case cited by the State in support of its argument 
that some states have held that the crime of attempted depraved 
indifference murder exists is People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 
1983). See State's brief at 11. However, the decision in Castro is 
based on the court's belief that the defendant's argument was 
"constructed on a faulty premise, namely, that the crime of extreme 
indifference murder entails an unintentional and inchoate act." 
Castro, 657 P.2d at 937. The Castro court discussed at length the 
requirement under the Colorado extreme indifference statute that the 
defendant intentionally engage in conduct that created a grave risk 
of death to another, and based its decision on this intent 
requirement. Hence, Castro is distinguishable since no intent 
requirement exists under the Utah depraved indifference statute. 
Furthermore, the reasoning of the Castro court is not convincing. 
Although Mr. Vigil acknowledges that this Court has held 
that depraved indifference is a mental state which is equivalent in 
moral culpability to a specific intent to kill (see Appellant's 
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opening brief at 6), it does not require an actual intent to kill. 
Attempted depraved indifference is therefore a legal impossibility. 
The State acknowledges that Mr. Vigil's argument is 
straightforward; Mr. Vigil's argument is supported by the language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, case law from this Court, the Model 
Penal Code, and the majority of case law from other jurisdictions. 
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court follow its decisions 
in Normanf Howell and Bell and require an intent to kill—not a 
mental state of equivalent culpability—in order to be guilty of 
attempted murder. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
order of the trial court, grant his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, and 
remand the case to the trial court with an order that Count III of 
the Information be dismissed and Count II be amended so as to delete 
the allegation that Mr. Vigil committed an attempted depraved 
indifference homicide. 
SUBMITTED this IS^H day of May, 1991. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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